Sector
Data Centres & Telecommunications in the Netherlands
Operating a data centre in the Netherlands requires coordinated protection of digital access, physical premises and the utilities supporting critical equipment.

Control remote maintenance and building automation
The Dutch National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recommends a joint risk assessment for IT and operational technology. Its OT guidance covers building management systems, external access, network segmentation and responsibility for outsourced operations. For remote access, it recommends limited privileges, multifactor authentication, encrypted connections, logging and regular review. [1]
For an operator, the work starts with an up-to-date inventory of controls, connections and authorised users. For cooling, power distribution and building automation, it must be clear which contractors can change settings and which other equipment those changes could affect. This assessment determines the security zones needed and the connections permitted between them.
For data centre service providers within scope, the NIS2 Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 requires risk-based segmentation and controlled remote access. Service-provider connections must follow an authorisation request and be limited in time; privileged accounts are subject to specific identification, authentication and authorisation requirements. [2]
A maintenance assignment should therefore establish who approves access, which systems can be reached and when permission expires. When a critical vulnerability emerges, operations and security personnel need to decide together on patching, temporary isolation or additional safeguards. The NCSC recommends testing OT updates in advance, taking availability and equipment safety into account. [1]
Plan physical access through to intervention
Physical access can enable interference with controls, cabling and equipment essential to utilities. The NCSC therefore includes physical access in OT security and highlights key management where external maintenance companies are involved. [1]
For providers within scope, the NIS2 Implementing Regulation requires risk-based security perimeters, appropriate entry controls and continuous monitoring for unauthorised physical access. Measures must be reviewed and tested regularly and following significant incidents or changes. [2]
In a colocation operation, operators, customers and maintenance firms need to limit their permissions to the areas each requires. Deliveries, plant rooms, switchgear and customer spaces need clear rules for approval, escorting and revocation of access. When a contractor changes, cards, keys and digital maintenance permissions should be updated together.
Acceptance testing should cover the full alarm response: who receives the alert, how it is assessed and who can intervene in the affected area. An access alarm during a communications outage is a useful exercise scenario. It can establish whether designated contacts, alternative communication channels and decision-making authority are actually available.
Secure utility controls, reserves and access
In January 2026, TenneT confirmed the continuing need for measures against grid overload in Noord-Holland and discussions with businesses about more flexible electricity consumption. Conditions and connection opportunities vary within the region. [3]
An operator using flexible supply arrangements needs to establish which loads may change and what reserve remains available if a disruption occurs at the same time. This calls for protected control interfaces, clearly authorised commands and verifiable limits on changes. The decision also concerns the security of energy management and building automation.
For providers within scope, the NIS2 Implementing Regulation addresses protection of supporting utilities, potential redundancy, emergency supply contracts, and monitoring, maintenance and testing of operationally essential supplies. Implementation depends on the risks and the applicability of each measure. [2]
Assessments of redundant supplies should pay particular attention to shared controls, transfer functions, rooms and maintenance access. A fire, an operating error or a compromised administration account can affect several supply paths at once. Operations, IT and facilities management should agree which conditions must be checked before equipment is re-energised and who authorises the restart.
Include flood risk in physical protection
The Dutch Klimaateffectatlas provides maps of flooding, extreme rainfall, heat and drought as an initial guide at regional and neighbourhood level. Individual sites then require closer investigation of local conditions and the equipment affected. [4]
The security assessment should cover the location of switchgear, cable entries, pumps and communication links. Access roads and resupply also matter: operations in a protected building can fail if maintenance staff or fuel cannot reach the site for an extended period.
This leads to decisions on structural protection, the positioning of critical equipment, alarm thresholds and when to take preventive action. For providers within scope, the NIS2 Implementing Regulation requires risk-based protection against physical and environmental threats and regular testing of protective measures. [2]
For a recovery site, the assessment should establish whether both facilities could be constrained by the same transport routes, utility networks or contractors. These dependencies belong in exercises covering prolonged disruption and in agreements with the companies involved.
Set clear obligations for contractors and incident response
For providers within scope, the NIS2 Implementing Regulation requires a supply chain security policy and risk-based contractual requirements. Where applicable, these include notification of security incidents, vulnerability handling, audit rights and rules for subcontractors. [2]
An operator needs an available contact at its maintenance and operations contractors, information about affected systems and the ability to suspend access at short notice when it presents a risk. These arrangements should align with authority to commission, change and reauthorise work. Response times promised to customers must also be achievable through the services provided by subcontractors.
During an incident, those responsible should be able to assess cyber alerts, access events and plant alarms together. For providers within scope, the Regulation requires documented procedures for detection, assessment, containment, recovery and communication; response procedures and recovery capability must also be tested regularly. [2]
An exercise could start with a compromised maintenance account. It can test who suspends access, how the impact on cooling is assessed, which logs are preserved and under what conditions the contractor may reconnect. The results reveal gaps in authority, information or technical capability.
Assign security accountability at management level
The Dutch Cyberbeveiligingswet implementing NIS2 has been in force since 15 August 2026. For data centre service providers, classification depends on factors including enterprise size, service and specific designation rules; Article 4 generally links national jurisdiction to the main establishment or representative. International operators need to assign responsibility for their respective services and legal entities. [5]
Article 21 requires appropriate technical, operational and organisational security measures, including protection of the physical environment. Under Article 24, the governing body must approve these measures. Significant incidents generally require reporting without delay, with an early warning no later than 24 hours and an incident notification no later than 72 hours after awareness. [5]
Management should turn these requirements into documented decisions: which risks take priority, who is responsible for implementation and which tests will demonstrate that the measures work? Outstanding vulnerabilities, deferred changes and contractor dependencies need named owners and deadlines that can be checked.
The complementary CER assessment must account for sectoral exemptions: Article 23 of the Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten exempts critical entities in digital infrastructure from obligations including risk assessment, duty of care and incident reporting under that Act. Applicable Cyberbeveiligingswet obligations continue to apply. [6] [5]
Prepare security decisions with Concepture
Concepture brings cybersecurity, physical protection and governance together in data centre security architecture. For an agreed site or service area, the Data Centre Resilience Check covers topics including perimeter and access, OT and building automation, emergency supplies, crisis procedures and evidence. Its findings organise dependencies, responsibilities and action priorities. Data Centre Resilience Check
A new maintenance contractor, an expansion, an upcoming audit or unresolved questions after an incident can provide a starting point for a technical discussion. The offer page describes the scope and limits of the check; certification, legal advice, penetration testing and comprehensive technical plant inspections are outside its scope. Data Centre Resilience Check
Sources
1 · NCSC: securing OT and industrial control systems
2 · NIS2 Implementing Regulation: Annex 3 and 4
3 · TenneT: grid congestion and flexibility in Noord-Holland
4 · Klimaateffectatlas: regional hazard information
5 · Cyberbeveiligingswet: scope and operator obligations

