Sector
Data Centres & Telecommunications in Canada
Security architecture for data centres and telecommunications in Canada.

In Canada, a data centre project depends less on available land than on a credible route to power. Provinces increasingly allocate grid capacity on their own terms, tie it to load curtailment, self-generation and evidence of sovereignty, and in doing so change what operators need to secure, both technically and organisationally.
Usable capacity starts with a documented route to power
Colliers puts Canada's built, energised and operating data centre capacity at around 1.4 gigawatts in September 2026, against at least 5.5 gigawatts of named planned and under-construction capacity; about 90 per cent of that pipeline is in Alberta. [1] The report sums up the situation in one sentence: Canada is not short of demand, but of capacity with a documented route to energisation. [1]
For investors and operators, this calls for a clear distinction. Allocated grid load, contractually secured power and commissioned IT capacity are three different levels of maturity. A campus plan with a gigawatt figure describes an objective; it becomes reliable only with a connection agreement, funded grid works, tariff assumptions and a realistic commissioning date for the first customer-ready phase.
Each province allocates power on its own terms
Grid connection and electricity supply in Canada are governed primarily at provincial level. The frameworks differ markedly in thresholds, selection processes and expected contributions:
- Québec: Since February 2023, new projects and load additions of 5 MW or more require government authorisation before connection. Applications are assessed comparatively; for data centres, digital sovereignty and waste heat recovery are additional criteria. Authorisations can carry conditions and milestones and may be revoked if a project changes substantially. [2] According to Hydro-Québec's evidence before the Régie de l'énergie, only 11 MW of roughly 1,500 MW allocated since 15 February 2023 went to new data centres; pending requests total around 2,500 MW. [3] A dedicated data centre rate is under review by the Régie in proceeding R-4333-2026; hearings run until December 2026. [4]
- Alberta: The system operator AESO set an interim allowance of 1,200 MW for new large loads of 75 MW or more until 2028; it is fully allocated. [5] The Data Centre Regulation, in force since June 2026, moves projects with dedicated new generation or storage to the front of the connection line; by the end of July 2026, requests totalled about 19,565 MW, against a provincial record peak of about 12,800 MW. [6] A levy on computing equipment also applies to facilities of 75 MW or more, at rates of 1 to 2 per cent that fall as the share of self-generation rises. [7]
- Ontario: Under Bill 40, the Protect Ontario by Securing Affordable Energy for Generations Act, 2025, transmitters and distributors may connect data centres and other "specified load facilities" only if they meet requirements set by regulation. The Data Centre Playbook presented in August 2026 also assesses projects for economic benefit, data sovereignty and investment in host communities. [8]
- British Columbia: B.C. Reg. 8/2026 caps new capacity for two years from 1 February 2026 at 100 MW for conventional and 300 MW for AI data centres. Projects of 10 MW or more receive power only through a competitive process whose minimum requirements include a willingness to curtail load on request. [9]
- Saskatchewan: The Data Centre Framework of August 2026 requires new projects to meet all generation needs independently of the provincial grid and prefers Canadian-owned, Canadian-headquartered partners. [10]
Comparing sites on power price and land alone is therefore not enough. What matters is the duration of the process, attached conditions, curtailment obligations and whether self-generation can be permitted and operated reliably.
System operators set requirements for electrical and control systems
As computing loads grow, so do the technical conditions for connection. In Ontario, version 3.0 of the IESO requirements for large computational loads applies to loads above 10 MW whose final System Impact Assessment is issued after 30 June 2026. [11] Among other things, no single point of failure may cause the loss of more than 600 MW of load, ramp rates are limited, and facilities above 25 MW must participate in automatic under-frequency load shedding. The system operator may require corrective action and, in certain cases, direct disconnection. [8]
UPS behaviour during voltage dips, protection settings and reconnection thereby become matters of grid compliance. In British Columbia, a willingness to curtail is a minimum condition for capacity allocation; in Alberta, curtailment is expected to become part of connection agreements. [9] [6] Reducing load on external request requires clearly authorised command paths, protected interfaces between energy management, building automation and IT, and practised procedures that prioritise customer services deliberately.
These control functions are a realistic target. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security judges it very likely that state actors are pre-positioning in critical infrastructure in Canada for possible disruption, and reports attempts to compromise internet-accessible operational technology through insecure remote access and default passwords. It identifies ransomware as the top cybercrime threat to critical infrastructure. [12]
Sovereignty becomes a selection and contract criterion
Several provinces explicitly link power allocation to questions of data control. In its competitive process, British Columbia may consider the jurisdiction in which the proposed operator was incorporated and how data is safeguarded against disclosure outside Canada. [9] Québec assesses, among other things, local control over infrastructure, platforms and applications and the hosting of critical Québec data. [2]
At federal level, the government presented Canada's Responsible Data Centre Development Principles in September 2026. They state that facilities supporting sensitive data, public services or critical infrastructure must meet appropriate requirements for Canadian legal protection, cybersecurity, continuity of service and reliable Canadian access. [13] The federal government draws a clear line between location and sovereignty: data stored in Canada may still be subject to foreign law if the provider can be compelled to disclose it. [14]
For internationally financed projects, the Investment Canada Act also gains weight. The guidelines on national security review list effects on critical infrastructure and access to sensitive personal data as factors; investments by state-owned or state-influenced investors receive enhanced scrutiny regardless of value. [15] Ownership structure, administrative access from abroad, key management and support models therefore belong early in project and contract design.
Federal law addresses cybersecurity through operator classes and supply chains
With Bill C-8, Canada enacted a new federal cybersecurity statute on 15 June 2026 (S.C. 2026, c. 9). Part 1 adds order-making powers to the Telecommunications Act that allow products and services of specified suppliers to be prohibited in, or removed from, telecommunications networks. Part 2 enacts the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act. [16]
Schedule 1 of the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act lists telecommunications services, interprovincial or international pipeline and power line systems, nuclear energy systems, federally regulated transportation systems, banking systems and clearing and settlement systems. Designated operators must establish a cyber security program, mitigate supply-chain and third-party risks, report incidents to the Communications Security Establishment within a period not exceeding 72 hours and keep records in Canada; administrative monetary penalties can reach 15 million Canadian dollars. [16] According to the consolidated version current to 21 September 2026, Part 2 was not yet in force; the government has announced phased implementation. [17] [18]
Data centres are not listed in Schedule 1 as a sector of their own. Direct obligations arise through designation of a class of operators; indirectly, the requirements reach data centres through banks, telecommunications companies and energy utilities that must secure their third-party services. Under Telecom Decision CRTC 2025-225, telecommunications service providers that own transmission facilities must also notify the CRTC, ISED and the responsible emergency management organisations of major outages within two hours. [19]
The Rogers outage of 8 July 2022 showed how closely network and operational capability are linked: more than twelve million customers lost wireless and wireline services. The management network depended on the failed IP core, and critical sites had no backup connectivity from another provider. [20] Management access that is independent of the production network is therefore a core element of resilient security architecture.
Customers require evidence for severe but plausible scenarios
Regulated customers pass their obligations on through contracts. OSFI Guideline B-10 on third-party risk expects banks and insurers to agree on the location of services, audit and information rights for the institution and the regulator, regularly tested continuity and recovery programmes, and rules for subcontractors. Continuity planning should address severe but plausible scenarios, including prolonged and simultaneous disruptions. [21]
Under the Direction for Electronic Data Residency, federal electronic data categorised as Protected B, Protected C or Classified must be stored in government-approved computing facilities in Canada. [22] In Québec, section 17 of the Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (P-39.1) requires a privacy impact assessment and a written agreement before personal information is communicated or entrusted outside the province. [23]
Plausible scenarios are well documented in Canada. The ice storm of 5 April 2023 affected 1.31 million Hydro-Québec customers, 1.125 million of them at the same time; most outages were caused by branches and trees falling on lines. [24] The 2023 wildfire season burned 16.5 million hectares and led to about 232,000 evacuations. [25] For operational planning, this means multi-day grid outages, closed access routes, evacuated staff and interrupted fuel logistics must be considered together.
Security architecture as a basis for decisions
Concepture connects physical security, cybersecurity and governance with the technical and organisational dependencies of data centre operations. In Canada, this means bringing provincial connection conditions, curtailment and self-generation, sovereignty requirements and the obligations of regulated customers together in one security architecture: from protected control and remote access through independent management access to crisis procedures for prolonged disruption.
A site decision, a due diligence process or new requirements from a financial or public-sector customer can provide a reason for a specialist discussion. For a defined site or scope of services, the Data Center Resilience Check offers a concrete starting point; its evaluation prioritises the actions required over the next 90 days.
The Readiness Call helps establish the reason for the discussion, the site and the desired outcome. The offer page describes the scope, approach and boundaries of the check; certification, legal advice, penetration testing and a complete inspection of technical systems are outside its scope, and mandatory specialist inspections or assessments remain unaffected.
Sources
[1] Colliers: Canadian Data Center Report, September 2026. Capacity, pipeline and documented route to energisation.
[2] Gouvernement du Québec: Autorisation de projets électriques, reviewed on 15 November 2026. Authorisation from 5 MW and assessment criteria.
[3] National Observer: Report of 27 October 2026 on Hydro-Québec's evidence before the Régie de l'énergie. Allocated and requested capacity for data centres.
[4] Régie de l'énergie: Proceeding R-4333-2026, hearing schedule. Data centre rate in Québec.
[5] AESO: AESO's Role in Data Centre Projects, 2026. Interim allowance of 1,200 MW for large loads of 75 MW or more.
[6] Government of Alberta: AI Data Centres in Alberta – Grid, reviewed on 15 November 2026. Data Centre Regulation, connection priority and curtailment.
[7] Gowling WLG: Alberta reshaping electricity system for data centres, 2026. Bill 8, Bill 12 and the computing equipment levy.
[8] Dentons: Ontario's Data Centre Playbook, 17 September 2026. Bill 40, the Playbook and IESO technical requirements.
[9] BC Laws: B.C. Reg. 8/2026, Data Centre Facility and Hydrogen Production Facility Power Supply Regulation. Capacity limits, competitive process and assessment criteria.
[10] Government of Saskatchewan: Data Centre Framework, August 2026. Six principles including self-supplied power.
[11] IESO: Technical Requirements for Large Computational Loads Connecting to the Ontario Power System. Scope and versions.
[12] Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–2026. State actors, operational technology and ransomware.
[13] ISED: Canada's Responsible Data Centre Development Principles, modified 22 September 2026. Principle 5: strategic value and Canadian access.
[14] Government of Canada: White Paper on Data Sovereignty and Public Cloud. Data residency and data sovereignty.
[15] ISED: Guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments, revised 5 March 2025. Critical infrastructure, sensitive data and state-influenced investors.
[16] Justice Laws: S.C. 2026, c. 9 (Bill C-8), in particular Telecommunications Act sections 15.1–15.2 and Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act sections 9, 15, 17, 30, 90–91 and Schedule 1. Statute text.
[17] Justice Laws: Consolidated version of S.C. 2026, c. 9, current to 21 September 2026. Coming into force of Part 2.
[18] Public Safety Canada: News release of 16 June 2026. Royal Assent and phased implementation.
[19] CRTC: Notification of major service outages, Telecom Decision CRTC 2025-225. Notification deadlines and thresholds for major outages.
[20] CRTC: Assessment of Rogers Networks for Resiliency and Reliability Following the 8 July 2022 Outage, July 2024. Causes and lessons of the Rogers outage.
[21] OSFI: Guideline B-10, Third-Party Risk Management. Contract provisions, continuity and subcontracting.
[22] Government of Canada: Direction for Electronic Data Residency, 2018. Storage location for Protected B, Protected C and Classified data.
[23] LégisQuébec: Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (P-39.1), section 17. Communication and outsourcing outside Québec.
[24] Hydro-Québec: Release on the April 2023 ice storm. Affected customers, causes and resilience measures.
[25] Statistics Canada: Economic and Social Reports, 25 June 2025. The 2023 and 2024 wildfire seasons.
Service basis: Concepture: Data Center Resilience Check.

